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Risky Propositions:  
A New Standard for the Award of Attorney’s 
Fees Against Defendant-Intervenors in  
Ballot-Initiative Litigation 
Matthew Slevin* 
In the current federal litigation regarding the constitutionality of Proposition 8, a ballot 
initiative that amended the California state constitution to ban same-sex marriage, the 
issue of which party should pay the prevailing plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees was raised at 
the district court in 2009. The official proponents of the same-sex marriage ban, who 
intervened to defend the law at trial and lost, argued that they should not be held liable 
for the fees. But if they are correct, then the State of California, which did not defend 
the law and called it unconstitutional, could be made to pay if a final judgment is 
reached in the plaintiffs’ favor. The issue has been postponed as the case moves 
through the appellate process. Using the Proposition 8 case as a prominent example, 
this Note explores the issue of who should pay a plaintiff’s attorney’s fees when the 
proponent of a successful ballot initiative intervenes to defend its law against a civil 
rights challenge and loses. It is a significant question not only in the context of the 
Proposition 8 case, but also in the larger context of the citizen-created ballot initiatives 
permitted in twenty-five jurisdictions. The Note proposes the adoption of a new 
standard in both federal and state courts for ballot-initiative litigation, under which the 
defendant-intervenor will be held liable for the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees unless it can 
show that its position was substantially justified. 
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Slevin_63-HLJ-860 (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2012  5:34 PM 
868 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:867 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 868 
I. The Law of Attorney’s Fees for Intervenors in Civil Rights 
Challenges ........................................................................................... 872 
A.  Evolution Under Federal Law ............................................ 873 
1.  The Statutory Civil Rights Exception ................................. 873 
2.  Applying the Exception to Intervenors .............................. 875 
3.  The Reach of the Frivolousness Standard: Circuit 
Courts Split ........................................................................... 877 
B.  Attorney’s Fees Under California Law ............................ 880 
1.  A History of Independent, Judge-Made Exceptions ........ 880 
2.  The California Supreme Court Might Follow the 
Federal Case Law ................................................................ 882 
II. The Context of Initiative Litigation ............................................... 883 
A.  Non-Intervenor Initiative Proponents Found Liable 
in California............................................................................. 883 
B.  PERRY V. BROWN: The Proposition 8 Proponent’s 
Argument .................................................................................. 884 
III. Finding a Different Standard .......................................................... 886 
A.  The Problem .............................................................................. 886 
B.  A Middle Ground: The Substantial-Justification 
Standard ................................................................................... 891 
C.  The Proposal ............................................................................ 894 




Over seven million California voters went to the polls in November 
2008 and voted “yes” on Proposition 8,1 thus amending the state 
constitution to ban same-sex marriage.2 The resulting federal constitutional 
challenge to that ban, Perry v. Brown,3 is currently progressing through 
 
 1. Debra Bowen, Cal. Sec’y of State, Statement of Vote: Nov. 4, 2008, General Election 13 
(2008). 
 2. Proposition 8 provides, “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.” Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5; see also Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 
927 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that Proposition 8 is invalid under the U.S. Constitution); Strauss v. 
Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009) (holding that Proposition 8 is a valid amendment to the California 
state constitution). 
 3. See Perry v. Brown (Perry IV), Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 
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the federal courts. In the case, two same-sex couples sued the State of 
California, alleging that Proposition 8 was an infringement on their civil 
rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 After state officials 
refused to defend the law because they too believed it to be 
unconstitutional, Proposition 8’s official proponent, Protectmarriage.com, 
intervened to defend it.5 As the case proceeds on appeal, the legal fees 
for the attorneys on both sides of the case continue to mount. The issue 
of whether Protectmarriage.com, rather than the State of California, will 
be liable to pay the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees if the plaintiffs prevail has 
been raised but thus far left open.6 
The Perry case brings into focus a question that has the potential to 
arise in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia, where citizen-
created ballot initiatives are utilized.7 The issue of who should pay the 
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees when an initiative proponent8 intervenes to 
defend its law against a civil rights challenge and does not prevail likely 
will continue to confront both federal and state courts as it has in the 
past.9 And cases like Perry, where the state refuses to defend the law, 
 
2012). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, on different grounds, the district court ruling in Perry I that 
Proposition 8 is unconstitutional. Id. at *2. The court also found that Protectmarriage.com, Proposition 
8’s official proponent and defendant-intervenor in the case, had standing to appeal the District Court’s 
judgment. Id. at *7. Previously, the Ninth Circuit had certified a question to the California Supreme 
Court regarding the standing question. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry II), 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th 
Cir. 2011), certified question answered sub nom. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011). 
The state court answered in the affirmative that initiative proponents do have the authority to assert 
the state’s interest in the validity of ballot propositions. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1015. 
 4. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 927. In the previous state-court challenge to Proposition 8, the 
California Supreme Court held that it was a valid amendment to the state constitution. Strauss, 207 
P.3d at 122. 
 5. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 921, 928. 
 6. Order at 2–3, Perry I, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010) (order granting plaintiffs’ 
motion to extend time). For an early discussion of these issues, see Rebecca Beyer, Prop. 8 Plaintiffs 
May Recoup Fees, Daily J., Sept. 16, 2010, available at www.uchastings.edu/media-and-news/news/ 
2010/09/levine-prop8-fees.html. 
 7. Initiatives are proposals for new state laws or constitutional amendments created by citizens 
and added to the electoral ballot upon the acquisition of a set number of citizen signatures. For a 
detailed explanation of initiatives and other types of ballot propositions, see What Are Ballot 
Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?, Initiative & Referendum Inst. Univ. S. Cal., 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Quick%20Fact%20-%20What%20is%20I&R.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 
2012). In order of adoption, the states that allow such initiatives are South Dakota, Utah, Oregon, 
Nevada, Montana, Oklahoma, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Colorado, Arkansas, California, Arizona, 
Nebraska, Idaho, Ohio, Washington, Mississippi, North Dakota, Massachusetts, Alaska, Wyoming, 
Illinois, Florida, and the District of Columbia. D.C. Code § 1-1001.16 (2010); State-By State List of 
Initiative and Referendum Provisions, Initiative & Referendum Inst. Univ. S. Cal., 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i&r.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
 8. The proponent of an initiative measure, as officially recognized by the California Elections 
Code, is a citizen who has presented a proposed initiative to the State before circulating a petition to 
have it placed on the ballot. Cal. Elec. Code § 9001 (2010). 
 9. One prominent federal initiative case is Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 
(1997). In that case (later dismissed for mootness), a state employee challenged an Arizona initiative 
that made English the official state language, and the initiative sponsors intervened as defendants. Id. 
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may come up again as well. Statutes exist in federal law and in all of the 
states providing specific exceptions to the general American Rule that 
litigating parties must pay their own attorney’s fees.10 One ubiquitous 
exception provides that in a civil rights suit, a prevailing party, other than 
the government, may recoup its legal fees from the losing party or 
parties.11 Federal and state courts, however, have each reached different 
conclusions as to which branch of government may fashion such 
exceptions.12 In the federal system, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated 
that Congress must create such exceptions.13 In some states, including 
California, courts have ruled that exceptions can be fashioned by judges 
as well as the legislature.14 
The Perry case is a prominent, but not isolated, example of a court 
being asked to decide whether a defendant-intervenor is liable for paying 
attorney’s fees to the plaintiff under a law that shifts fees in civil rights 
challenges. In 2004 in Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed, the 
plaintiffs prevailed in a civil rights challenge to a Washington state law.15 
The Ninth Circuit followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes16 in finding liability 
for fees against the defendant-intervenors.17 The Zipes Court held that an 
intervenor in a civil rights case will be liable for attorney’s fees only if the 
intervenor’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”18 
In Reed, the Ninth Circuit applied this standard. Finding the intervenor’s 
 
at 49–50, 56. In California, the initiatives regarding same-sex marriage have been challenged in both 
state and federal courts. Proposition 8 was preceded in 2000 by Proposition 22, a successful initiative 
that banned same-sex marriage via statute. Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5 (2010); Lockyer v. City of S.F., 
95 P.3d 459, 463 (Cal. 2004). The California Supreme Court subsequently held that San Francisco 
public officials had acted unlawfully in issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples under 
Proposition 22. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 464. In 2008, the court found Prop. 22 invalid under the state 
constitution. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008). Then, before the current federal 
challenge in Perry, the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8 as a valid amendment to the 
state constitution. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 122. 
 10. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (announcing the American Rule); 
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021 (2010) (codifying the American Rule); infra 
Part I.A.1. 
 11. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2010); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5 (2010); N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 8601 (McKinney 2011); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8309 (2011); see also 1 Court Awarded 
Attorney Fees 5.03 (MB 2011). 
 12. See infra Part I.A for discussion of diverging development of fee-shifting exceptions between 
the federal system and, by example, the California system. 
 13. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). 
 14. California, Arizona, Idaho, and Utah all have ruled that fee-shifting exceptions can be judge 
made. See Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 775 P.2d 521, 537 (Ariz. 1989); Serrano v. Priest, 569 
P.2d 1303, 1313–14 (Cal. 1977); Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 682 P.2d 524, 531 (Idaho 1984); Stewart v. Utah 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 783 (Utah 1994). 
 15. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed (Reed II), 388 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 16. 491 U.S. 754 (1989). 
 17. Reed II, 388 F.3d at 1288. 
 18. 491 U.S. at 760 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). 
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position was not frivolous, it held the defendant State of Washington, but 
not the defendant-intervenors, fully responsible for the fees to be paid to 
the plaintiffs.19 A ruling in Perry, which is currently before the Ninth 
Circuit, thus will likely adopt the Zipes standard as well. In Perry, this 
could free Protectmarriage.com of liability for fees and would oblige the 
State of California to pay for the defense of a law it did not support or 
believe to be constitutional.20 
A 2006 California Supreme Court case suggested that the Zipes 
standard might be appropriate for civil rights challenges in California 
courts, too.21 Such a move would represent a sea change in California 
law. Because California courts, unlike federal courts, have the power to 
create fee-shifting exceptions to the American Rule,22 it would be 
unnecessary for the California Supreme Court to follow the nonbinding 
Zipes standard.23 The same applies to the many other states that permit 
judge-made exceptions.24 
State laws enacted through the initiative process are, by design, 
supported by private entities and not the state government.25 This Note 
contends that it is illogical to excuse intervening initiative proponents 
who take an active role in resulting civil rights challenges from bearing a 
greater risk of liability for attorney’s fees when they lose. This is 
especially true when the government is justified in choosing not to 
defend the law. The high Zipes standard makes it unlikely that these 
intervenors will be required to pay any portion of the fees. Conversely, a 
rule whereby initiative proponents are almost always liable for fees if 
they lose is likely to strongly discourage advocates from intervening to 
defend their propositions at all, thus conflicting with the rationale behind 
the American Rule.26 Such a rule also could have a chilling effect on 
initiative systems as a whole. 
 
 19. 388 F.3d at 1288. 
 20. Beyer, supra note 6. 
 21. Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 129 P.3d 1, 10 n.6 (Cal. 2006). 
 22. Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1313 (Cal. 1977) (noting that it is within the California 
Supreme Court’s “sole competence” to fashion equitable exceptions to the American Rule). 
 23. The Zipes decision is not binding on state courts because its holding concerned congressional 
fee-shifting legislation that applies only to federal courts. See 491 U.S. at 761. 
 24. See supra note 14 (listing examples of states that fall into this category). 
 25. See What Are Ballot Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?, supra note 7 (defining the 
various types of propositions). 
 26. See 6 Robert L. Rossi, Attorneys’ Fees § 6:1 (3d ed. 2011). The rationale behind the 
American Rule  
includes a number of broad policy considerations. First, since litigation is at best uncertain, 
one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit. Second, 
requiring each party to be responsible for its own fees is thought to encourage settlement. 
Moreover, the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their 
rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel. Additionally, 
the litigation and proof of what constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees would pose a 
substantial burden for judicial administration. 
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This Note proposes that the Zipes rule should not be applied in the 
context of initiative litigation over civil rights, nor should the lower 
standard that several lower federal courts used before Zipes.27 This Note 
explores the relevant law in the federal system and, by example, the State 
of California. The Note proposes the adoption of a third standard under 
both federal and state law for proposition intervenors that is analogous 
to that of the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),28 where the 
defendant-intervenor would be liable for the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees 
unless it could show that its position was substantially justified. The most 
effective way to implement this rule in the federal system would be for 
Congress to carve out a statutory exception for initiative litigation. But in 
some states, like California, this new rule may be fashioned by the courts 
or the legislature. 
This Note is divided into three parts. Part I gives an overview of the 
modern development of attorney’s fees law both at the federal level and 
in California, and the rationales behind their diverging evolution, with a 
particular focus on applicability to intervenors. Part II discusses the 
context of initiative litigation, describing the treatment of attorney’s fees 
in recent initiative litigation in California state courts and the current fee 
issue raised in federal court in the Proposition 8 case. Part III analyzes 
and critiques the potential application of the Zipes standard in the 
context of initiative litigation, and the deterrent effect that a general rule 
holding proponents liable would have on the state proposition system. 
Seeking a middle ground, this Note then discusses the substantial-
justification standard found in the EAJA and other bodies of law. 
Finally, it concludes by advocating for the adoption of that standard for 
intervening initiative advocates in both the federal and state systems, and 
details how implementation could be accomplished at each level. 
I.  The Law of Attorney’s Fees for Intervenors in 
Civil Rights Challenges 
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that only Congress may fashion new exceptions to 
the rule that litigants in federal court must pay their own attorney’s 
 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Huizar, 52 P.3d 816, 818 (Colo. 2002) (citations omitted). 
 27. See, e.g., Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1064–65 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding defendant-
intervenors liable for attorney’s fees because they made a “unilateral decision” to join the state 
defendants in “adamantly defending” the challenged law); Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128, 132 
(6th Cir. 1979) (holding a defendant-intervenor liable for fees when their position created a 
“substantial barrier” to appellees’ ability to achieve their constitutional rights); Moten v. Bricklayers 
Int’l Union of Am., 543 F.2d 224, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding a would-be intervenor liable for fees); 
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1268, 1272–75 (N.D. Ohio 1984) 
(holding a defendant-intervenor liable for fees because intervention was voluntary and the intervenor 
litigated vigorously, causing the plaintiff to expend substantial efforts). 
 28. See 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2010); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2010); see also infra Part III.B. 
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fees.29 Because that decision is not binding on the practices of state 
courts, the standards for determining fee awards in some states, including 
California, have developed independently.30 The standard for 
determining losing defendant-intervenors’ liability for the plaintiffs’ fees 
is not settled at the federal level and has not been directly addressed in 
California.31 
A. Evolution Under Federal Law 
The modern federal law of attorney’s fee awards in civil rights 
challenges begins with Alyeska, where the Supreme Court held that only 
Congress may fashion exceptions to the American Rule for federal 
litigation.32 Subsequently, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act of 1976, providing such exceptions for prevailing 
parties in civil rights cases.33 Throughout the following decade, federal 
courts’ application of that exception to intervenors was inconsistent.34 
The Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Zipes set forth a standard for 
applying a statutory civil rights exception to intervenors.35 The federal 
courts of appeals, however, have diverged on how broadly that standard 
should be applied.36 
1. The Statutory Civil Rights Exception 
In the U.S., the well-established American Rule requires litigants to 
pay their own attorney’s fees, with the prevailing party not entitled to 
collect such fees from the loser unless a contract or statute provides 
otherwise.37 The English Rule, by contrast, typically provides that the 
loser must pay the attorney’s fees of the prevailing party.38 Two major 
exceptions to the American Rule were long recognized by courts at 
common law: the common-benefit and bad-faith doctrines.39 The 
 
 29. 421 U.S. 240, 270–71 (1975). 
 30. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 31. See infra Parts I.A.3, I.B.2. 
 32. 421 U.S. at 270–71. 
 33. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2010)). 
 34. See infra Part I.A.2 and text accompanying notes 53–54. 
 35. See Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761 (1989). 
 36. Compare Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen., 297 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2002), with 
Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed (Reed I), 343 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2003); see infra Part I.A.3. 
 37. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 (1975); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 
714, 717 (1967). The rule was first announced by the Supreme Court in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (“The general practice of the United States is in opposition to [an award]; and 
even if that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it 
is changed, or modified, by statute.”). 
 38. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 (1975) (explaining that in England, attorney’s fees are regularly 
awarded to the prevailing party). 
 39. Henry Cohen, Cong. Research Serv., 94-970, Awards of Attorneys’ Fees by Federal 
Courts and Federal Agencies 1–2 (2008). 
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common-benefit doctrine provides that a party who maintains a suit for 
the common benefit may collect fees from those who benefit from the 
suit, but not from the losing party.40 The bad-faith doctrine holds a losing 
party liable for fees for punitive reasons if they have acted “vexatiously, 
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”41 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Alyeska in 1975, some 
federal courts also awarded fees under the “private attorney general 
theory,” which provides that plaintiffs should be entitled to fees as a 
matter of policy if they win a lawsuit bringing benefits to a broad class of 
citizens.42 In Alyeska, the plaintiffs sought fee awards under that theory.43 
The Court declined to find the defendant liable for fees, refusing to 
recognize the private attorney general theory as a viable common law 
doctrine.44 The Court held that that only Congress, not the federal courts, 
may create federal exceptions to the American Rule.45 
Congress responded to the Alyeska decision by passing the Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act in order to promote the enforcement 
of civil rights laws by private citizens.46 The resulting statute, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988, provides that courts may award attorney’s fees under a variety of 
civil rights statutes that do not already contain a fee-shifting provision.47 
Under the statute, the fees may be awarded to the prevailing party.48 The 
prevailing-party requirement soon resulted in a different standard for 
awarding fees to plaintiffs versus defendants,49 and some difficulties arose 
 
 40. Id. at 3. 
 41. Id. at 4 (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)). 
 42. Id. at 5. 
 43. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 270–71. 
 44. Id. at 269. 
 45. Id. at 270–71. 
 46. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the 
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 346 (1980). 
 47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2010), which provides: 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, 
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, . . . [or] title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . . 
Congress has proceeded to carve out fee-shifting exceptions to the American Rule in an ever-
increasing number of laws and subject matter areas. 1 Court Awarded Attorney Fees 1.03 (MB 2011). 
 48. Id.; see also 43 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2010) (discussing the application of “prevailing party”). The 
Court would later hold that a plaintiff “prevails” when they are awarded relief on the merits, 
modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff so that the legal 
relationship between the parties is materially altered. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 (1992). 
 49. See Dreyfuss, supra note 46, at 353–55. The Court held that successful plaintiffs are entitled to 
fees unless “special circumstances” would make it unjust. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 
400, 402 (1968). But the Court then found that the standard for whether a prevailing defendant should 
be awarded fees was whether the claim against them was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation.” Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). 
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in determining fees when a plaintiff is successful on some, but not all, of 
the issues.50 
2. Applying the Exception to Intervenors51 
Federal courts soon began to reach a range of results in holding 
intervening parties liable for such fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act. In the early 1980s, several federal district court cases 
held that parties intervening on behalf of defendants were liable for 
attorney’s fees under § 1988 where they “placed themselves in a position 
to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining relief”52 and “imposed substantial 
costs on plaintiffs.”53 Other federal courts ruled differently, finding 
intervenors not liable based on the fact that they did not themselves 
obstruct the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.54 
In the 1988 Seventh Circuit case Charles v. Daley, a group of 
physicians prevailed in their civil rights challenge against an Illinois state 
law regulating abortion.55 Another group of doctors that supported the 
law intervened to defend the rights of patients as well as their own 
interests.56 The plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees against the defendant-
intervenors.57 In response, the defendant-intervenors raised a First 
Amendment claim, arguing that holding them liable for attorney’s fees 
would violate their “right to participate in litigation as a means of 
political expression”58 and their “fundamental freedoms of association 
and expression.”59 
The Charles court rejected the free speech argument, holding that 
litigation goes beyond speech and that there is an expectation that 
 
 50. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (“[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing 
parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves 
some of the benefit the parties sought in the suit.” (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278–79 
(1st Cir. 1978))). 
 51. This Note discusses “intervenors” in reference to parties who have entered litigation in 
federal courts under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In California courts, 
intervention is provided for under section 387 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 
 52. Vulcan Soc’y of Westchester Cnty., Inc. v. Fire Dep’t of White Plains, 533 F. Supp. 1054, 1062 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 53. See, e.g., May v. Cooperman, 578 F. Supp. 1308, 1317 (D.N.J. 1984), aff’d in part, dismissed in 
part, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985). See generally Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1979); 
Moten v. Bricklayers Int’l Union of Am., 543 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Akron Ctr. for Reprod. 
Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Decker v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 564 F. 
Supp. 1273 (E.D. Wis. 1983). 
 54. See, e.g., Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 524 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
 55. 846 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1060. 
 58. Id. at 1061. 
 59. Id. at 1074. 
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litigation will be costly.60 The court explained that even though the 
intervenors themselves did not violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, 
they would nevertheless be held liable for attorney’s fees under § 1988.61 
The court noted that the intervenors had made a “unilateral decision” to 
join the state defendants in “adamantly defending” the state abortion 
law, and thus could be considered full-fledged parties to the suit.62 The 
court found that, because nothing in § 1988 exempted specific classes of 
defendants from fee liability, holding intervenors liable would be 
consistent with Congress’s intent to provide awards as incentives for civil 
rights plaintiffs.63 
Two years later, in Zipes,64 a group of employees brought a sex 
discrimination action in the Northern District of Illinois against a 
commercial airline under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
provides for the award of fees to the prevailing party.65 The intervenor 
was a union representing current employees of the airline who opposed 
the terms of the settlement between the parties under the employees’ 
own contractual rights.66 The intervenor brought an affirmative Title VII 
claim of its own, which the trial court rejected.67 The plaintiffs then 
petitioned for attorney’s fees against the intervenor.68 
Zipes set a landmark standard under which intervenors could be 
held liable for attorney’s fees in a civil rights action. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that assessing fees against “blameless” intervenors was not 
essential to Congress’s purpose, which was to encourage victims of 
discrimination to pursue legal action.69 The opinion also considered that 
intervention, when pursued in good faith, is not a method of prolonging 
litigation, but rather protecting the intervenor’s own rights.70 The Court 
decided that the same standard it had previously established in 
Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission71 for holding losing plaintiffs liable for fees should be 
applied to the intervenor in Zipes.72 Thus, the Court explained, an 
intervenor would be liable for fees only where its own actions were 
 
 60. Id. at 1075. 
 61. Id. at 1077. 
 62. Id. at 1064. 
 63. Id. at 1063–64. 
 64. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989). 
 65. Id. at 757–58. The Court had previously stated that all fee-shifting statutes would be treated 
alike; thus the Zipes holding applies to § 1988 fees as well. Id. at 758 n.2. 
 66. Id. at 757. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 757–58. 
 69. Id. at 761. 
 70. Id. at 765. 
 71. 434 U.S. 412, 417 (1978). 
 72. Zipes, 491 U.S. at 761. 
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“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”73 The Court remanded 
the case to the lower court to make that determination.74 Justice 
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, arguing that the 
majority’s suggestion that all intervenors should be treated like civil 
rights plaintiffs was contrary to the language and objectives of Title VII.75 
Justice Marshall cited the then-recent Charles case as an example of a 
situation where an intervenor’s sole purpose in the litigation was to 
defend the challenged law, and argued that intervenors, therefore, should 
be held to a different standard for attorney’s fee liability.76 
3. The Reach of the Frivolousness Standard: Circuit Courts Split 
The Zipes holding has been criticized for treating intervenors the 
same as civil rights plaintiffs.77 Critics note that intervenors do not 
necessarily behave like plaintiffs and bring their own civil rights claims, 
as the union did in Zipes.78 These arguments assume that under Zipes the 
frivolousness standard applies to all intervenors, not only to intervenors 
bringing their own affirmative civil rights claims. This view also assumes 
that Zipes abrogated the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Charles, in which 
the defendant-intervenor was held liable for fees without a finding that 
its position was frivolous.79 And indeed, although the facts of Zipes 
involved an intervenor who was acting as a plaintiff, the language of the 
Court’s holding was broad: 
[W]e conclude that district courts should . . . award Title VII attorney’s 
fees against losing intervenors only where the intervenors’ action was 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. . . . In every lawsuit in 
which there is a prevailing Title VII plaintiff there will also be a losing 
defendant who has committed a legal wrong. That defendant will . . . be 
liable for all of the fees . . . .80 
Some courts have gone further, interpreting Zipes to extend to 
“prevailing parties’ request[s] for intervention-related attorneys’ fees 
 
 73. Id. at 766. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 775, 778. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 778 n.8 (“When [intervenors] . . . voluntarily intervene, they benefit from ‘their ability to 
affect the course and substance of the litigation,’ and thus should ‘fairly be charged with the 
consequences,’ including the risk of attorney’s fees.” (quoting Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1067 
(7th Cir. 1988))).  
 77. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen., 297 F.3d 253, 263–64 (3d Cir. 2002); see 
also Zipes, 491 U.S. at 778 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Cynthia G. Thomas, Note, Defendant-Intervenors’ 
Liability for Attorneys’ Fees in Civil Rights Litigation: A Standing Requirement for Functional 
Plaintiffs, 35 Wayne L. Rev. 1499, 1515–16 (1989). 
 78. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 77, at 1515–16. 
 79. Brief for Petitioner at 31 n.13, Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 129 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2006) (No. 
S125502), 2004 WL 2863084. 
 80. 491 U.S. at 761.  
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from the losing defendant.”81 Advocates of a broad view of Zipes have 
also argued that even if Charles is still good law, it applies only to 
defendant-intervenors with a “direct, financial and personal interest in 
the underlying litigation.”82 
Subscribing to the interpretation that Zipes applies to all 
intervenors, the Ninth Circuit applied the frivolousness standard to civil 
rights defendant-intervenors in Reed.83 There, the Democratic, 
Republican, and Libertarian parties successfully challenged the State of 
Washington’s “blanket primary” law on civil rights grounds.84 The 
Washington Secretary of State defended the law in his official capacity.85 
The plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees on appeal under § 1988 against 
both the Secretary of State and the defendant-intervenor, a nonprofit 
organization that defended the challenged law.86 The court reasoned that 
although the intervenor’s arguments caused the plaintiffs to spend extra 
time on the case, that fact alone did not warrant an award against them.87 
The court then expressly relied on Zipes to say that all intervenors in 
civil rights cases should be held liable for fees only if their position was 
“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”88 Accordingly, the 
court ordered the state to pay the attorney’s fees award in full and did 
not find the intervenors liable.89 
But the law is unsettled on how broadly the Supreme Court 
intended Zipes to apply. Since Zipes was published, courts have 
questioned whether Zipes and Charles can be reconciled.90 Several courts 
have held that Zipes created a far more limited rule. The Seventh Circuit, 
while never having expressly applied its holding in Charles, has 
continued to cite the case post-Zipes, examining it in a 2005 decision 
awarding fees to a prevailing defendant-intervenor.91 In Planned 
 
 81. Gratz v. Bollinger, 353 F. Supp. 2d 929, 940 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (citing Rum Creek Coal Sales, 
Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 176–78 (4th Cir. 1994); Bigby v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 1426, 1428–29 
(7th Cir. 1991)). 
 82. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 79, at 31 n.13. 
 83. Reed II, 388 F.3d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 84. Id. at 1284. Under the “blanket primary” law, Washington voters were not restricted to voting 
for candidates of a particular political party. Reed I, 343 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). The parties all 
challenged the law, claiming it restrained their supporters’ freedom of association. Id. 
 85. Reed II, 388 F.3d at 1282. 
 86. See id. at 1288. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (The court acknowledged that while Zipes dealt with an action under Title VII, it could 
not find any reason why the Zipes holding should not extend to § 1988). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See United States v. City of S.F., 132 F.R.D. 533, 537 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d sub nom. Davis v. 
City of S.F., 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on denial of reh’g, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 
1993) (discussing the significance of the Supreme Court’s Zipes decision in tandem with its earlier 
denial of the writ of certiorari in Charles). 
 91. King v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 410 F.3d 404, 412–13, 421–23 (7th Cir. 2005) (considering an 
attorney’s fees award against the plaintiff in favor of a prevailing defendant-intervenor). 
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Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Attorney General, the Third Circuit 
quoted a case from the District of New Jersey that considered fees 
against defendant-intervenors in a civil rights case, expressing “serious 
doubts” about Zipes’ applicability: 
In Zipes, the Supreme Court reasoned that the intervenors were 
completely “blameless,” having had no part in the constitutional 
violation of which plaintiffs complained, and intervened only to protect 
their own rights . . . . Moreover, the Court reasoned that there were 
present in the action “guilty” defendants, who would be liable, in any 
event, for the counsel fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs. [The court] 
question[s] the defendants-intervenors’ qualifications as “blameless” 
intervenors, in light of the vigorous battle fought defending an 
unconstitutional statute, and, in addition, cannot ignore the absence in 
this case of a “guilty” defendant who otherwise would be liable for these 
fees.92 
The Third Circuit also quoted the Southern District of Florida, 
which took a similar position in awarding fees against a defendant-
intervenor, based on a finding that the Zipes frivolousness standard 
should be applied only when the intervenor was “innocent.”93 The 
Florida case held that Zipes should not apply when “[the intervenor] 
entered the case early in the proceedings and vigorously defended the 
constitutionality of the statute throughout the entire proceeding.”94 In 
adopting this reasoning, the Third Circuit opined that an application of 
Zipes to cases where defendant-intervenors vigorously defended against 
a successful civil rights challenge would “thwart the purpose of the fee-
shifting statutes.”95 
The view that Charles is still good law is further supported by the 
fact that the Supreme Court was aware of the Seventh Circuit’s then-
recent Charles ruling when deciding Zipes. This is evident in Justice 
Marshall’s dissent, in which he cited Charles in arguing that intervenors 
not affirmatively asserting their own civil rights claim should have to take 
the risk of liability for attorney’s fees.96 The majority, however, did not 
respond to Justice Marshall on this point or cite Charles in its opinion. 
The absence of any reference to Charles from the majority’s analysis 
suggests the two cases could be read together. 
 
 92. 297 F.3d 253, 263–64 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Daggett v. Kimmelman, Nos. 82–297, 82–388, 
1989 WL 120742, at *7 n.6 (D.N.J. July 18, 1989)). 
 93. Id. at 264 (quoting Mallory v. Harkness, 923 F. Supp. 1546, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1996), aff’d, 109 
F.3d 771 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
 94. Mallory v. Harkness, 923 F. Supp. 1546, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1996). 
 95. Planned Parenthood, 297 F.3d at 265. 
 96. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 778 n.8 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
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B. Attorney’s Fees Under California Law 
California, like several other states,97 has followed a different path in 
its development of attorney’s fees law over the past few decades, as state 
courts are not bound by the federal court decisions just discussed.98 For 
example, the California Supreme Court has expressly rejected the 
Alyeska doctrine and ruled that judges may create fee-shifting exceptions 
for California courts.99 California courts have proceeded to develop those 
exceptions through case law in the decades since.100 But in 2006, the 
California Supreme Court implied that it might implement the Zipes 
standard for defendant-intervenors.101 
1. A History of Independent, Judge-Made Exceptions 
Two years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1975 Alyeska ruling, the 
California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Serrano v. Priest, in which 
the prevailing plaintiff moved for an award of attorney’s fees under the 
same common law doctrine that Alyeska had recently rejected: the 
private attorney general theory.102 The plaintiffs in Serrano had 
succeeded in a constitutional claim regarding the state public school 
financing system.103 They asked the state court to use its equitable powers 
to fashion a judicial exception to the American Rule.104 In its resulting 
opinion, the California Supreme Court expressly rejected the Alyeska 
holding that statutory authorization was needed for courts to recognize a 
private attorney general theory105 and affirmed the award of attorney’s 
fees to the plaintiffs under such a theory.106 Besides allowing for relief 
under the private attorney general theory as a common law doctrine,107 
 
 97. See supra note 14. 
 98. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 569 P.2d 1303, 1312 (Cal. 1977). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See infra text accompanying notes 102–07. 
 101. See Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 129 P.3d 1, 10 n.6 (Cal. 2006); discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 102. 569 P.2d at 1312. 
 103. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 557 P.2d 929, 958 (Cal. 1976). 
 104. Serrano II, 569 P.2d at 1306–1307. In California, the American Rule is codified at California 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021, which provides: 
Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of 
compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or 
implied, of the parties; but parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs, as 
hereinafter provided. 
 105. Serrano II, 569 P.2d at 1316. 
 106. Id. at 1313. 
 107. The California legislature subsequently codified the private attorney general theory. See Cal. 
Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5 (2010) (“Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful 
party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an 
important right affecting the public interest [if certain requirements are met].”). 
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the Serrano court held that it was in its “sole competence” to fashion 
equitable exceptions to the state’s codification of the American Rule.108 
The California Supreme Court has continued on this trajectory by 
using its power to approve additional fee-shifting exceptions. In 1983, the 
court approved the “catalyst” theory for awarding attorney’s fees to a 
plaintiff.109 Under this theory, a court can award attorney’s fees even 
when the litigation does not result in a decision from the court, so long as 
the litigation provides the primary relief sought, thereby causing the 
defendant to substantially change its behavior.110 More recently, the court 
refined its interpretation of this doctrine in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp., holding that liability for fees is warranted only if the underlying 
lawsuit had merit and the plaintiff engaged in a reasonable attempt to 
settle before commencing litigation.111 In doing so, the California court 
again refused to follow the U.S. Supreme Court, which recently had 
rejected the catalyst theory.112 In Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los 
Angeles, a companion case to Graham that was decided on the same day, 
the California Supreme Court, at the request of the Ninth Circuit, 
provided a three-part test for what a plaintiff must show to obtain fees 
under the state’s version of the doctrine.113 
The California Supreme Court has used this power to create other 
exceptions to the American Rule in specific areas of the law. For 
example, in Brandt v. Superior Court, it held that attorney’s fees are 
recoverable from an insurance company that breaches its duty of good 
faith by unfairly withholding benefits.114 Also, California has adopted a 
more lenient standard than the U.S. Supreme Court on the issue of 
enhancement of attorney’s fees due to the attorney’s superior 
performance.115 
 
 108. Serrano II, 569 P.2d at 1313. 
 109. Westside Cmty. for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 657 P.2d 365, 367 (Cal. 1983). While 
affirming the doctrine, the court denied fees under the catalyst theory because it found no causal 
connection between the litigation and defendant’s change in behavior. Id. at 368. 
 110. Id. at 367. As the court noted, some federal courts at that point had used the same reasoning 
to award fees under federal fee-shifting statutes. Id. (citing, inter alia, Sullivan v. Pa. Dep’t of Labor & 
Indus., 663 F.2d 443, 465 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
 111. 101 P.3d 140, 144 (Cal. 2004). 
 112. Id. at 147–56 (examining Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 622 (2001)). 
 113. 101 P.3d 174, 177 (Cal. 2004) (“[A] plaintiff must establish that (1) the lawsuit was a catalyst 
motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought; (2) that the lawsuit had merit and 
achieved its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of expense . . . and, 
(3) that the plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit.”). 
 114. 693 P.2d 796, 800 (Cal. 1985). 
 115. Compare Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1674 (2010) (holding that an 
enhancement of fees due to exceptional performance should be allowed only in “rare” and 
“exceptional” circumstances), with Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 746 (Cal. 2001) (affirming a fee 
enhancement due to exceptional performance based on counsel’s documentation). 
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2. The California Supreme Court Might Follow the Federal Case 
Law 
After spending years carving its own path in the many areas of 
attorney’s fees law, the California Supreme Court has suggested that it 
may follow federal standards for civil rights defendant-intervenors. In the 
2006 case Connerly v. State Personnel Board, that court considered a 
plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees against amici curiae under the 
private attorney general theory.116 In the underlying litigation, the 
plaintiff had prevailed in a civil rights challenge to portions of a 
California statutory scheme that provided for affirmative action 
programs for state agencies.117 In the suit, the state agencies named as 
defendants had opted not to defend the statutes, and instead various 
amici curiae advocacy groups that supported affirmative action were 
designated as real parties in interest.118 The trial court then awarded 
attorney’s fees to the plaintiff under the private attorney general theory, 
to be paid by the state agencies and only one of the advocacy groups, the 
California Business Council, with the agencies collectively owing five-
sixths of the award.119 The Court of Appeal upheld the award.120 
The California Supreme Court held that the advocacy group was not 
liable for fees because, although the group had actively participated in 
the litigation as a real party in interest, as amici they did not have a direct 
interest in the litigation and were not even partly responsible for the 
statutory policy that had given rise to the litigation.121 The court reasoned 
that it did not want to construe the California fee-shifting statute in a way 
that would discourage amici curiae participation.122 The court further 
justified holding the state agencies liable for fees by noting that the state 
had the exclusive power to abandon or change the challenged law, but 
had declined to do so.123 
In a footnote, the Connerly court acknowledged that both parties 
had cited Zipes and Charles as persuasive authority.124 The defending 
advocacy group had argued that the Zipes standard should be adopted in 
California to apply to amici, while the plaintiff relied on Charles.125 The 
court dismissed both cases as inapplicable, explaining that each dealt 
 
 116. 129 P.3d 1, 2 (Cal. 2006). 
 117. Id. The statutory scheme was invalidated as unconstitutional under article I, section 31 of the 
California Constitution, a proposition-enacted 1996 amendment that outlawed such programs. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 4. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 9–10. 
 122. Id. at 9. 
 123. Id. at 10. 
 124. Id. at 10 n.6. 
 125. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 79, at 29–34; Brief for Respondent at 28–33, Connerly, 129 
P.3d 1 (No. S125502), 2004 WL 3256433. 
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with intervening parties, not amici curiae.126 The question of which 
standard applies to defendant-intervenors in California was thus left 
undecided.127 Significant to the discussion here is the fact that by noting 
this, the court left open the question of whether it would be willing to 
adopt the Zipes or Charles rules as persuasive authority in the future. 
II.  The Context of Initiative Litigation 
In twenty-four states and the District of Columbia, citizens may 
introduce ballot initiatives.128 When the state declines to defend enacted 
initiatives against civil rights challenges and initiative proponents 
intervene as defendants and lose, it raises the issue of whether the 
proponent or the state should pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. An 
ongoing line of cases in state and federal court, concerning challenges to 
California initiatives banning same-sex marriage, are illustrative. 
A. Non-Intervenor Initiative Proponents Found Liable in 
California 
A 2009 decision suggests that California state courts might be 
willing to find intervening initiative proponents liable for fees. The 
California Court of Appeal held in In re Marriage Cases that an initiative 
proponent who was not an intervenor was liable for fees after the law it 
defended was struck down on civil rights grounds.129 The underlying 
litigation concerned Proposition 22130 and had begun when the initiative’s 
official proponent, Campaign for California Families, filed suit against 
the City of San Francisco under the enacted statute to prohibit the city 
from issuing same-sex marriage licenses.131 The proponent prevailed at 
the California Supreme Court, which issued a writ of mandate 
compelling the city to comply with the statute absent a judicial 
determination that Proposition 22 was unconstitutional.132 That suit was 
then consolidated in an action before the California Supreme Court in 
2008 to determine the validity of Proposition 22 under the state 
constitution.133 The proponent, however, was not granted standing in the 
constitutional challenge, and thus only participated as amicus curiae at 
 
 126. Connerly, 129 P.3d at 10 n.6. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See What Are Ballot Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?, supra note 7.  
 129. No. A123634, 2009 WL 2515727, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2009). 
 130. Prior to Proposition 8, Proposition 22 created a statute banning same-sex marriage in California. 
See Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5, invalidated by In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008). 
 131. Lockyer v. City of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 462–63 (Cal. 2004). 
 132. Id. at 492, 499. 
 133. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
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that stage.134 The California Supreme Court then held that Proposition 22 
was unconstitutional.135 
On remand to determine payment of attorney’s fees, the California 
Court of Appeal wrote an unpublished decision awarding fees to the 
prevailing plaintiffs against the initiative proponent.136 Asserting that it 
should not be liable for the fees, the proponent in In re Marriage Cases 
argued that it was amicus curiae and thus, under Connerly, attorney’s 
fees liability was precluded.137 The court disagreed, explaining that 
although the proponent served as amicus curiae in the constitutional 
challenge, it should be treated as a party for the purpose of attorney’s 
fees liability because it originally brought its own suit, which had 
instigated the entire litigation.138 The court went on to explain that the 
proponent “chose an active role in the litigation on its own and not at the 
invitation of the court or opposing parties. . . . [It] steadfastly argued at 
every level that it had standing to sue as a party and refused to 
participate solely as an amicus.”139 The court concluded that the 
proponent was liable for a portion of the attorney’s fees.140 
The proponent in In re Marriage Cases was not an intervenor and, as 
the court noted, “[t]here was no lack of adversity . . . that required [it] to 
step in.”141 The court’s determination regarding fees is unpublished and 
thus does not serve as precedent. But the court’s reasoning could be read 
to suggest that California courts might be inclined to hold an intervening 
proponent liable for fees when it has taken an active role in the litigation 
beyond that of amicus curiae. 
B. PERRY V. BROWN: The Proposition 8 Proponent’s Argument 
The highly publicized Perry v. Brown litigation (originally named 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger) is currently progressing through the federal 
courts.142 In Perry, the plaintiffs, two same-sex couples, brought a federal 
 
 134. Id. at 406. The Campaign was precluded from seeking relief in In re Marriage Cases due to the 
stay the California Supreme Court previously granted in its favor in Lockyer. Id. 
 135. Id. at 452. 
 136. In re Marriage Cases, No. A123634, 2009 WL 2515727 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2009). 
Unpublished opinions “must not be cited or relied on” under California Rule of Court 8.1115 (2011). 
 137. In re Marriage Cases, 2009 WL 2515727, at *3. 
 138. Id. at *7. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. At that point, the State of California was defending the ban on same-sex marriage. 
 142. See supra note 3. At the time of this writing, the Ninth Circuit has issued its decision 
affirming, on different grounds, the district court finding that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional. Perry 
IV, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). The district court had held 
that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it denies same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 
2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The Ninth Circuit did not reach that issue, instead holding more 
narrowly that Proposition 8 violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it withdrew a right that was 
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constitutional challenge in the Northern District of California to the state 
constitutional amendment created by Proposition 8.143 Proposition 8 
provides, “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or 
recognized in California.”144 The plaintiffs alleged that Proposition 8 
deprives them of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.145 In their action, the plaintiffs named as defendants the 
Governor, Attorney General, several other state government officers, 
and two county clerks in their official capacities.146 The Attorney General 
conceded that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, and the other named 
officials refused to take a position on the merits of the claims.147 
Protectmarriage.com, the official proponent of Proposition 8, intervened 
in the federal case to defend the proposition in the state’s absence, and 
did so vigorously through the trial proceedings.148 The district court found 
for the plaintiffs, ruling Proposition 8 unconstitutional, and entered a 
permanent injunction against its enforcement.149 Protectmarriage.com 
then filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The state officials did not join 
in the appeal.150 The Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction pending the 
appeal.151 
The plaintiffs then filed a motion at the district court to extend the 
fourteen-day statutory deadline to file their motion for attorney’s fees 
and costs.152 In their opposition, Protectmarriage.com argued that it 
should not be held liable for attorney’s fees, citing as controlling Ninth 
Circuit precedent Reed’s holding that all intervenors in civil rights cases 
should be subject to the Zipes frivolousness standard.153 In the ensuing 
order, the district court ruled that “any motion for fees and costs” would 
not be decided until “all appeals from the judgment are final.”154 In 
 
previously held by same-sex couples in California. Perry IV, 2012 WL 372713, at *1–2. The Ninth 
Circuit also held that the defendant-intervenor in the case had standing to appeal. Id. at *7. 
 143. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The case was filed immediately after the 
California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8 under state law, see Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 
122 (Cal. 2009). 
 144. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 927. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 928. 
 147. Id. The Attorney General at the time was Jerry Brown, who was later sworn in as Governor 
in January 2011. Anthony York, The Brown Inauguration: Difficult Choices in a New Era, L.A. Times, 
Jan. 4, 2011, at 10.  
 148. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 930. 
 149. Id. at 1003–04. 
 150. Perry II, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011), certified question answered sub nom. Perry III, 265 
P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011). 
 151. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). 
 152. Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Motion to Enlarge Time to File a Bill of Costs, Perry I, 
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. 09-CV-2292). 
 153. Defendant-Intervenors Opposition to Motion to Enlarge Time at 2, Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
921 (No. 09-CV-2292). 
 154. Order, Perry I, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010). Chief Judge Vaughn Walker, who 
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February 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, on different grounds, that 
Proposition 8 is unconstitutional.155 Still, pending an appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, presumably the attorney’s fees issue will not be decided 
for “at least months and possibly years.”156 
III.  Finding a Different Standard 
Zipes created a high standard for finding an intervenor liable for 
attorney’s fees. This creates a likelihood that initiative proponent 
intervenors who lose will not be made liable for the civil rights plaintiff’s 
fees. This is unfair, especially in cases like Perry where the state does not 
defend the law at all. Fortunately, a more appropriate standard for 
determining attorney’s fees liability exists elsewhere in the law. This 
standard, found in a federal statutory scheme creating a fee-shifting 
exception for suits against the federal government, should be applied to 
defendant-intervenors in initiative litigation. 
A. The Problem 
The Ninth Circuit’s Reed decision suggests that the court is willing 
to apply the Zipes standard in any constitutional challenge where the 
prevailing plaintiff moves for fees against a defendant-intervenor.157 The 
California Supreme Court’s footnote distinguishing Zipes in Connerly 
signaled that it too might use that standard when the facts are similar.158 
But in litigation arising from a ballot initiative, this is unjustified. State 
laws enacted via initiative are generated, advocated for, and placed on 
the ballot by private entities, not the state government.159 It is unfair for 
defendant-intervenors in initiative litigation to be subject to the cost of 
the successful challenger’s attorney’s fees only if the high Zipes standard 
is met. Such a practice would mean that the state would be liable for all 
attorney’s fees unless the initiative proponent’s position was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation. In a case like Perry, where the state 
has chosen not to defend the proposition and the proponents are the only 
defendants, such a low risk for fee liability to those proponents is 
unreasonable. 
 
issued the order, has since retired. See Bob Egelko, Judge Who Struck Down Prop. 8 to Retire, S.F. 
Chron., Sept. 30, 2010, at C-1. Thus, a different judge in the Northern District of California will 
ultimately decide the issue. 
 155. Perry IV, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). The court 
also held that Protectmarriage.com had standing to bring the appeal on behalf of the state. Id. at *7. 
 156. Beyer, supra note 6 (making this prediction in September 2010). 
 157. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 158. See Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 129 P.3d 1, 10 n.6 (Cal. 2006). 
 159. See What Are Ballot Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?, supra note 7 (defining the 
various types of propositions). 
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Arguably, Zipes need not be applied to defendant-intervenors at all. 
As discussed previously, the standard may be appropriately applied only 
to plaintiff-intervenors, not all intervenors.160 The reasoning in Zipes 
turned on the fact that the intervenor in that case brought its own cause 
of action in good faith and was interested in protecting its own civil 
rights.161 The Supreme Court treated the Zipes intervenor as a plaintiff, 
which is why it imported the Christianburg rule that had been created for 
actual plaintiffs.162 It should follow, as Justice Marshall argued in his 
Zipes dissent, that defendant-intervenors who instead take a defending 
position that the challenged law does not violate the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights should not be put in the same category as the Zipes 
intervenors.163 This interpretation could be adopted in California, where 
the Zipes rule is not controlling and where the courts have taken an 
independent path in creating fee-shifting jurisprudence. The California 
Supreme Court could either read Zipes narrowly or expressly reject its 
holding, just as it did with Alyeska.164 
But, as discussed, in the past twenty years Zipes often has been read 
more broadly.165 That interpretation is grounded in the broadly worded 
holding166 as well as other language in the opinion, which states that the 
fact that “an intervenor can advance the same argument as a defendant 
does not mean that the two must be treated alike for purposes of fee 
assessments.”167 The Ninth Circuit, having adopted Zipes for a defendant-
intervenor in Reed,168 would have to overrule or distinguish Reed to adopt 
such a narrow interpretation of Zipes. 
Even if courts continue to interpret Zipes to apply to defendant-
intervenors, as in Reed, an exception is appropriate for initiative 
litigation. The argument that intervenors should not be liable for fees 
often focuses on the fact that they themselves did not violate the 
 
 160. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 161. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 762 (1989) (“[The intervenor 
entered the lawsuit] not because it bore any responsibility for the practice alleged to have violated 
Title VII, but because it sought to protect the bargained-for seniority rights of its employees.”). 
 162. See id. at 765. 
 163. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen., 297 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(asserting that an application of Zipes to cases where defendant-intervenors vigorously defend against 
a successful civil rights challenge “would thwart the purpose of the fee-shifting statutes”); see also 
Zipes, 491 U.S. at 778 (Marshall, J., dissenting); supra Part I.A.2. 
 164. See Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 101 P.3d 140, 154 (Cal. 2004) (rejecting the reasoning 
of Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 
(2001)); Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1316 (Cal. 1977) (rejecting the reasoning of Alyeska Pipeline 
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)); see also discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 165. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 166. See Zipes, 491 U.S. at 761; supra Part I.A.3. 
 167. Zipes, 491 U.S. at 765. 
 168. Reed II, 388 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.169 That was true in Zipes, where the court 
emphasized the need for a “crucial connection between liability for 
violation of federal law and liability for attorney’s fees under federal fee-
shifting statutes.”170 That was also true in Reed, where the challenged law 
had been in place for over seventy years, and the defendant-intervenors 
were a nonprofit organization that now supported it.171 And that fact was 
also acknowledged in Charles, where fees were granted anyway.172 
But in initiative litigation, where the losing defendant-intervenors 
are the initiative’s proponents, they have in fact contributed to the 
violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, albeit indirectly. Even 
though only the state can grant court-ordered relief, and the violation 
results from the state’s enforcement of the enacted law, the defendant-
intervenors’ action is the root of the violation; the enactment and 
enforcement of an initiative results from the proponent and the state 
working in tandem. Thus, unlike many defendant-intervenors, who as in 
Charles or Reed are merely advocacy groups that support the challenged 
law, initiative proponents are more like true defendants. 
Indeed, proponents who intervene to defend the law take an active 
role in the litigation beyond that of amicus curiae. Proponents that 
choose to take that extra step should be given different treatment. The 
California Court of Appeal’s logic in holding the proponent of 
Proposition 22 liable for fees is illustrative.173 The proponent in that case 
was a party, not an intervenor, and thus the court did not need to 
consider an application of the Zipes standard. But the court grounded its 
reasoning in the fact that the proponent had chosen to become an active 
party in the litigation, having brought the original suit as a plaintiff and 
thus took on a role that differed significantly from that of the many amici 
curiae who also participated.174 The same rationale justifies holding 
proponents liable for attorney’s fees when they take on a similarly active 
role as intervenors. In Perry, for example, Protectmarriage.com 
participated fully in the litigation, putting on a full defense with its own 
witnesses, because the state put on no defense whatsoever.175 
An extreme solution would treat initiative advocates who have 
intervened and effectively stepped fully into the shoes of the absent state 
defendants as regular defendants when it comes to the assessment of 
 
 169. See, e.g., Zipes, 491 U.S. at 761 (calling the intervenors “blameless”); Charles v. Daley, 846 
F.2d 1057, 1064 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 170. 491 U.S. at 762. 
 171. Reed II, 388 F.3d at 1284. 
 172. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1077. 
 173. See In re Marriage Cases, No. A123634, 2009 WL 2515727, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 
2009); supra Part II.A. 
 174. In re Marriage Cases, 2009 WL 2515727, at *7. 
 175. See Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 944–52 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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fees.176 In that scenario, the defendant-intervenors would be held fully 
liable for fees under the relevant fee-shifting statute as if they were the 
state. However, a policy holding initiative proponents always liable by 
law for fees is likely to be met with valid objections. A clear-cut rule 
could have a chilling effect on initiative proponents’ willingness to 
defend their adopted law in court.177 That policy also would seem to 
thwart the basic policy behind the American Rule, which is to keep from 
discouraging litigation by imposing a requirement to pay the opposing 
party’s attorney’s fees.178 Second, one could raise the argument, made in 
Charles, that assessing fees against defendant-intervenors infringes on 
their association and expression rights. Advocates would be strongly 
discouraged from defending their initiatives, given the risk that they 
would be responsible for attorney’s fees if they lose. While this argument 
was rejected in Charles when applied to an advocacy group, it is more 
likely to be accepted in initiative litigation, where the initiative 
proponent’s vigorous defense of the enacted law is an extension or 
continuation of their political expression in championing it.179 
In Perry v. Brown, the defendant-intervenor, Protectmarriage.com, 
is the official proponent responsible for placing Proposition 8 on the 
ballot, and the State of California has taken the position that the law is 
unconstitutional and has refused from the start of the federal litigation to 
defend it.180 If the challengers to Proposition 8 prevail, and the Northern 
District, Ninth Circuit, or U.S. Supreme Court applies the Zipes standard 
in assessing fees, it is more than likely that the State of California will 
shoulder the full cost of attorney’s fees for the lengthy litigation, unless 
Protectmarriage.com’s position is found to be “frivolous, unreasonable, 
or without foundation.”181 That is because, besides the fact that 
 
 176. Such a treatment of Protectmarriage.com is not out of the question, given the Ninth Circuit’s 
and the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in holding that Protectmarriage.com has Article III 
standing to appeal the district court’s judgment. See Perry IV, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 
372713, at *10 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (“When the Attorney General of California . . . defend[s] the 
validity of a state statute . . . she stands in the shoes of the State to assert its interests in 
litigation. . . . The same is true of Proponents here . . . .”); see also Perry III, 265 P.3d 1002, 1023 (Cal. 
2011) (“[T]he role played by the proponents in [initiative] litigation is comparable to the role 
ordinarily played by the Attorney General or other public officials in vigorously defending a duly 
enacted state law and raising all arguable legal theories upon which a challenged provision may be 
sustained.”). 
 177. When costs for obtaining signatures and campaigning for a ballot initiative are very expensive, 
the added burden of ultimately paying plaintiff’s attorney’s fees may not always have a strong 
deterrent effect. In the case of Proposition 8, campaign contributions for the initiative totaled 
approximately $40 million (and campaign contributions against Proposition 8 totaled $43 million). 
Jesse McKinley, California Releasing Donor List for $83 Million Marriage Vote, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 
2009, at A13. 
 178. See Rossi, supra note 26, § 6:1. 
 179. See McKinley, supra note 177. 
 180. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 181. However, it is certainly possible. The district court in Perry I found that Proposition 8 
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Proposition 8 was supported and voted on by millions of Californians,182 
the stance that marriage should be defined as a union between a man and 
a woman has significant support throughout in the U.S.183 
For these reasons, the Zipes standard is inappropriate for Perry. 
Protectmarriage.com is not asserting its own affirmative civil rights claim 
like the intervenor was in Zipes. And although the constitutional rights 
violation created by Proposition 8 would have been caused directly by 
California’s enforcement of the law, and only the state would be able to 
provide relief, it can hardly be said that Protectmarriage.com was 
blameless in causing the violation. And just like the proponent of 
Proposition 22 in In re Marriage Cases, which was held liable for fees,184 
Protectmarriage.com chose to go beyond mere participation as amicus 
curiae and take an active role in the Perry litigation. However, treating 
Protectmarriage.com as a full defendant, subject by law to fee-shifting 
statutes, could have an undue chilling effect on California’s initiative and 
 
“fail[ed] to possess even a rational basis.” See id. at 997. In rejecting each of Protectmarriage.com’s 
rationales, the court remarked that they were “nothing more than a fear or unarticulated dislike of 
same-sex couples” and “post-hoc justifications.” Id. at 1002. The Ninth Circuit found that 
“Proposition 8 serves no purpose, and has no effect, other than to lessen the status and human dignity 
of gays and lesbians in California.” Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 
2012). It also found that “Proposition 8 is not rationally related . . . to either of [the] purported 
interests” advanced by the defendant-intervenors. Id. at *20. Given this harsh treatment of 
Protectmarriage.com’s arguments, a finding that its position falls below the Zipes standard is not 
inconceivable. Still, the fact that the Ninth Circuit panel ruling was 2–1 signals that a finding of 
frivolousness is not the most likely outcome. See id. at *29–45 (Smith, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 182. Beyer, supra note 6 (“[Protectmarriage.com] lost decisively [at the district court], yes, but I 
don’t think you can say that what they did was frivolous or without foundation . . . . They defended a 
proposition that was voted on by seven million plus voters in California.” (quoting Professor David 
Levine)). 
 183. The most prominent and current example is the litigation over the Defense of Marriage Act 
(“DOMA”), the federal law passed in 1996 that defines marriage as “a legal union between one man 
and one woman.” See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2010). DOMA has been defended in numerous court challenges 
since its passage, notably being held unconstitutional in the District of Massachusetts. See Gill v. 
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 397 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that DOMA is a violation of 
the Fifth Amendment); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 
253 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment). Several other challenges 
to DOMA are pending in the federal courts at the time of this writing. The Department of Justice had 
previously defended the law. In February 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder sent a letter to the 
House of Representatives, explaining that the Department of Justice will cease to defend the statute in 
constitutional challenges based on his and President Obama’s determination that it is unconstitutional. 
See Jerry Markon and Sandhya Somashekhar, In Gay Rights Victory, Obama Administration Won’t 
Defend Defense of Marriage Act, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1. The House of Representatives has 
since taken up defending DOMA in court. Felicia Sonmez, House to Defend the Defense of Marriage 
Act in Court, Wash. Post (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2011/03/09/AR2011030906188.html. 
 184. See In re Marriage Cases, No. A123634, 2009 WL 2515727, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 
2009); supra Part II.A. 
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referendum process by deterring proponents who wish to defend laws 
approved by the voters.185 
In sum, even if Zipes were meant to apply to ordinary defendant-
intervenors, an exception of some kind should be made for initiative 
litigation both in California and at the federal level. Given the competing 
policy interests, it is not fair to assess fees against losing intervening 
initiative proponents only if their position was “frivolous, unreasonable, 
or without foundation,” nor does it make sense to assess fees against 
them as a matter of course. This is because the proponents have 
contributed to the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, 
whether the state joins them in defending the law in court, or steps out of 
the picture like in Perry. Therefore, finding a new, middle-ground 
standard for assessing fees against those proponents is appropriate. 
B. A Middle Ground: The Substantial-Justification Standard 
A standard that exists elsewhere in attorney’s fees law, both in 
federal and state statutory schemes, could be the answer. The Equal 
Access to Justice Act186 provides a standard for attorney’s fees to be 
awarded to eligible plaintiffs against the federal government.187 The 
EAJA widened the scope of claims for which fees could be awarded 
beyond those dealing with civil rights.188 Its effect was to supplement, not 
supersede, the federal fee-shifting statutes already in existence.189 The 
EAJA provides that a court must award fees to any party who prevails in 
a non-tort civil action against the federal government, “unless the court 
finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or 
that special circumstances make an award unjust.”190 
The EAJA had three objectives: to give private citizens an incentive 
to challenge government wrongdoing, to deter such wrongdoing, and to 
provide better compensation for the injured plaintiffs.191 On the other 
hand, Congress did not want potential fee liability to have a chilling 
 
 185. See Perry III, 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (2011) (“[T]he initiative and referendum 
[process] . . . articulat[es] ‘one of the most precious rights of our democratic process.’” (quoting 
Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 
1976))). 
 186. Congress first passed the Act in 1980 as temporary program, which lapsed in 1984. Equal 
Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325, 2327 (1980). In 1985, the Act was reenacted as 
a permanent statute. Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985). 
 187. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2010) (applying to administrative proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2010) 
(providing for court proceedings). 
 188. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2010). 
 189. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of 
Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 La. L. Rev. 217, 251 (1994). 
 190. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2010). 
 191. Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to Justice Act—A Qualified Success, 
11 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 458, 458 (1993). 
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effect on government action.192 Therefore, instead of requiring mandatory 
fees from the government, Congress opted for a middle ground with the 
substantial-justification standard.193 
The term “substantial justification,” although not defined within the 
EAJA, was not a new standard.194 It was a concept borrowed from the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide a court with the ability 
to impose attorney’s fees on parties who fail to cooperate with a 
discovery request, unless they can show substantial justification.195 In that 
context, the term is measured by whether a reasonable person would 
consider the party to be bound to comply with discovery.196 Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court has interpreted the EAJA’s use of “substantially 
justified” under the same reasonableness test.197 The Court said that to 
avoid liability for fees, the government has the burden to show that its 
position has a “reasonable basis both in law and fact.”198 The Ninth 
Circuit has noted that the government’s “position” includes not only the 
position taken during litigation, but also in the action on which the 
litigation is based.199 
It is well established that, under the EAJA, the fact that the 
government has lost on the merits does not by itself raise a presumption 
that the government’s position was without substantial justification.200 
Instead, the inquiry takes “a fresh look at the case” and considers the 
government’s decision to pursue a claim or to defend one.201 In Pierce v. 
Underwood, the Supreme Court affirmed an award under the newly-
enacted EAJA.202 The dispute arose from a challenge to the Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development’s refusal to implement a subsidy 
program authorized by federal statute.203 After the case settled, the 
plaintiffs moved for an attorney’s fees award under the EAJA.204 In 
affirming the award granted by the lower courts, the Court reexamined 
the merits of the government’s position to determine whether it was 
 
 192. H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 139. 
 193. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 14 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4993. 
 194. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of 
Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part Two), 56 La. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1995) 
[hereinafter Sisk, Part Two]. 
 195. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5), (b)(2). 
 196. 8B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2288 (3d ed. 2010). 
 197. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 556 (1988). 
 198. Id. at 565. 
 199. Meinhold v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 123 F.3d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 131 F.3d 842 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
 200. Sisk, Part Two, supra note 194, at 23–24. 
 201. Id. at 24. 
 202. 487 U.S. at 571. 
 203. Id. at 555. 
 204. Id. at 557. 
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substantially justified.205 The Court found that it was not, noting that the 
government had weak legal support for its argument and pointing to the 
government’s erroneous statutory interpretation and misplaced reliance 
on precedent.206 
In contrast to the EAJA, the “frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation” standard advanced in Zipes and Christianburg places the 
burden of persuasion on the prevailing party instead of the losing one. In 
Pierce, the Court drew a specific distinction between the two standards, 
explaining that “substantially justified” means “more than merely 
undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness.”207 In other words, the EAJA 
standard sets a standard for the government more demanding than 
simply a showing that their position was not frivolous. Thus, under the 
EAJA, the government must make a significant showing that their 
position was substantially justified in order to avoid fees, unlike the Zipes 
rule, where a prevailing party must make a stronger showing of 
frivolousness in order to collect fees from an intervenor. One final key 
difference between the standards is that the EAJA, unlike many other 
civil rights fee-shifting statutes, sets a specific ceiling on the hourly rate of 
attorney’s fees that may be awarded, unless the court determines that 
some special factor warrants higher fees.208 
California courts are no strangers to the substantial-justification 
standard. The language regarding sanctions for discovery misconduct in 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (from which the substantial-
justification standard in the EAJA was borrowed) is mirrored in the 
counterpart rule in the California Code of Civil Procedure.209 Elsewhere 
in California law, the standard is already used in reference to prevailing 
parties’ entitlement to attorney’s fees against the state government, 
specifically in the rules governing tax210 and insurance proceedings.211 
 
 205. Id. at 569–71. 
 206. Id. The Court did not consider whether the government’s position fell below the lower 
standard of being “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” because only the “substantially 
justified” standard was relevant under the EAJA. See id. at 578 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 207. Id. at 566. 
 208. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (2010). The current limit is $125 per hour. Id. To determine the fee 
rate, courts calculate a lodestar figure by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on 
litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. 14A Wright et al., supra note 196, § 3660.1; see also Sisk, Part 
Two, supra note 194, at 108. 
 209. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2023.010–.040 (2010); see also id. § 1987.2 (“[T]he court may inits 
discretion award . . . expenses . . . including reasonable attorney’s fees” incurred by a motion or 
opposition to subpoena documents if done so “in bad faith or without substantial justification . . . .”). 
 210. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 7156(c)(2)(A)(i) (2010) (providing that a prevailing party 
in a case against the state shall be entitled to reasonable litigation costs if the state’s position was not 
substantially justified); see also Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 32469, 43520 (2010) (providing that 
taxpayers are entitled to fees and expenses for certain types of hearings before the tax board upon a 
finding that the board’s position was not substantially justified); Nw. Energetic Serv., LLC v. Cal. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 664–65 (Ct. App. 2008) (contrasting the substantial-
justification standard with the private attorney general theory found in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5 
Slevin_63-HLJ-860 (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2012  5:34 PM 
894 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:867 
C. The Proposal 
This Note’s proposal is to hold losing intervening initiative 
proponents to the same middle-ground standard to which the federal 
government is held under the EAJA. This would create a possibility that 
those nonprevailing proponents would be at least partly liable for the 
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees under applicable fee-shifting law, because the 
unsuccessful proponents would be required to show that their position 
was substantially justified. 
The proposal represents a balance of interests, just like the EAJA. 
First, adopting the substantial-justification standard instead of the 
frivolousness standard would make a finding of liability for the 
defendant-intervenor more likely. This is because the burden of 
persuasion is shifted from the prevailing plaintiff that is moving for fees 
to the initiative proponent that seeks to avoid paying them. This would 
result in the same deterrent effect on initiative proponents that is at the 
core of the public policy behind the EAJA, which is to deter 
wrongdoing.212 Proponents would be less likely to promulgate or 
subsequently defend a potentially unconstitutional initiative if they 
anticipate being liable for a challenger’s attorney’s fees as a matter of 
course.213 Instead, they would choose to participate merely as amici 
curiae and not become an active party in litigation, as long as the 
government is defending the law. 
At the same time, using the substantial-justification standard avoids 
a rule that would almost always hold the intervenor liable as a matter of 
course. As discussed, such a policy goes against the basic rationale 
behind the American Rule of not deterring lawsuits, and also might 
implicate concerns with regard to proponents’ political expression as 
litigants.214 Like the standard in the EAJA, where Congress wanted to 
avoid a chilling effect on government action,215 the substantial-
justification standard would not discourage initiative proponents too 
strongly. And by leaving open the possibility that the state could share in 
the fee award, an application of this standard would recognize the state’s 
contributory role in enacting voter initiatives, regardless of whether the 
state then choose to defend them in court.216 
 
(2010)). 
 211. See Cal. Ins. Code § 737(d) (2010). 
 212. See supra Part III.B. 
 213. But see supra note 148 (discussing that given the expense of some proposition campaigns, 
attorney’s fees may not have a deterring effect in all cases). 
 214. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the First Amendment argument raised in Charles); supra Part 
II.A. (discussing the policy behind the American Rule). 
 215. H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 139. 
 216. The interest of nondeterrence would also be served by applying a ceiling on the awardable fee 
rates, much the way the EAJA does. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (2010). However, this Note does 
not suggest such a limit should be imposed. In Pierce v. Underwood, the Court explained that the 
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Using the substantial-justification standard also would leave room 
for the courts’ discretion in finding joint liability. If the intervenor’s 
position were found not to be substantially justified, the proportion of 
the fees for which the intervenor was liable would then depend on the 
facts. The questions of whether the state was an active defendant and 
whether there were other defendant-intervenors in the case whose 
positions were not substantially justified would be largely determinative. 
For example, in a case where the initiative proponents actively defended 
the law alongside the state and there was a finding that the proponent’s 
position was not substantially justified, the court could order the 
plaintiff’s fees to be split evenly between the proponent and the state. 
Or, in a case where the initiative proponents defended the law and the 
state was silent, perhaps the fees could be divided unevenly, with the 
proponents owing a greater percentage. And at the opposite end of the 
spectrum, in a case like Perry, where the intervenor is the sole defendant 
and the state has affirmatively stated that it is not behind the challenged 
law, a court could potentially hold the defendant-intervenors fully liable 
for fees. 
D. Implementation 
In the federal system, the implementation of the substantial-
justification standard for intervening initiative proponents in civil rights 
cases could be accomplished in a number of ways. First, initiative-
litigation cases could simply be distinguished from the existing precedent. 
Neither Zipes, nor Charles, nor Reed was a ballot-initiative challenge 
defended by initiative proponents. Therefore, the new standard could be 
judicially created, just as the Zipes standard was. The Supreme Court or 
a federal appellate court could create this new standard while still 
preserving Zipes in one of two ways. First, it could limit that case’s 
holding to apply to only plaintiff-intervenors, as the Third Circuit did.217 
Alternately, it could provide that Zipes does in fact apply broadly to all 
civil rights intervenors, but then carve out a specific exception to the 
Zipes standard for initiative proponents. With Perry currently 
progressing through the federal court system, an opportunity may arise 
to promulgate this new standard. But the most efficient and effective 
method would be for Congress to create this exception, borrowing the 
substantial-justification standard from the EAJA just as it did originally 
from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
EAJA fee cap was put in place because “Congress thought that . . . [it] was generally quite enough 
public reimbursement for lawyers’ fees.” 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988). So if the policy behind the ceiling 
was to avoid assessing excessive fees against taxpayers, it is not applicable in the case of initiative 
proponents who have raised millions of dollars in funding to support their law. 
 217. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att’y Gen., 297 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2002); supra 
Part I.A.2. 
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In California, as in other states with their own attorney’s fees law, 
putting this new standard into effect would be even simpler. Zipes is not 
binding on state courts, and the Connerly decision was an expressly 
narrow one addressing only the liability of an amicus curiae. Thus the 
California Supreme Court, particularly with its tradition of independent 
attorney’s fees jurisprudence,218 has the discretion to adopt a distinct 
standard for initiative litigation. Further, the unpublished In re Marriage 
Cases decision by the California Court of Appeal already has provided a 
strong rationale supporting liability for initiative proponents who have 
taken an active role in the litigation. Finally, because the substantial-
justification standard is familiar to California courts,219 applying it in this 
context would not be a far stretch. The California Supreme Court could 
do so in the next civil rights challenge that is brought successfully against 
an enacted voter initiative in California state courts and in which a 
proponent intervenes.220 
Conclusion 
It is unfair for defendant-intervenors to avoid nearly all chance of 
liability for attorney’s fees for unsuccessful civil rights defenses of laws 
they sought to enact but which turn out to be illegal. The Zipes standard 
is inappropriate for initiative litigation in any of the twenty-five 
jurisdictions where such suits may arise. But because automatically 
holding nonprevailing initiative proponents liable for fees might have too 
great a deterrent effect on participating in such litigation, a middle 
ground is needed. The Equal Access to Justice Act, with its substantial-
justification standard, provides an ideal solution. Legislators and courts 
at both the federal and state levels have the ability to apply this standard 
to defendant-intervenors in initiative litigation. The pending Proposition 




 218. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 219. See supra Part III.B. 
 220. Of which there are likely to be many. See Hon. Ronald M. George, Keynote Address, 62 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1515, 1518 (2010) (“The [California Supreme Court] frequently is called upon to resolve legal 
challenges to voter initiatives.”). The California Supreme Court’s dicta in finding that 
Protectmarriage.com had standing to appeal makes intervention by proponents seem nearly 
mandatory. See Perry III, 265 P.3d 1002, 1024 (2011) (“The initiative power would be significantly 
impaired if there were no one to assert the state’s interest in the validity of the measure when elected 
officials decline to defend it in court or to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure.”). On 
February 13, 2012, the Ninth Circuit heard arguments in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. 
Brown, Nos. 11-15100, 11-15241 (9th Cir. filed May 23, 2011), an appeal from a constitutional 
challenge to California’s Proposition 209, in which Governor Jerry Brown has declined to defend the 
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